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ABSTRACT
Cyber-attacks pose a growing threat to global commerce that is increas-
ingly reliant on digital technology to conduct business. Traditional risk
assessment and underwriting practices face serious shortcomings when
encountered with cyber threats. Conventional assessment frameworks
rate risk based on historical frequency and severity of losses incurred,
this method is effective for known risks; however, due to the absence of
historical data, prove ineffective for assessing cyber risk. This paper pro-
poses a conceptual cyber risk classification and assessment framework,
designed to demonstrate the significance of proactive and reactive bar-
riers in reducing companies’ exposure to cyber risk and quantify the
risk. This method combines a bow-tie model with a risk matrix to pro-
duce a rating based on the likelihood of a cyber-threat occurring and
the potential severity of the resulting consequences. The model can
accommodate both historical data and expert opinion and previously
known frameworks to score the Threats, Barriers and Escalators for the
framework. The resultant framework is applied to a large city hospital in
Europe. The results highlighted both cyber weaknesses and actions that
should be taken to bolster cyber defences. The results provide a quick
visual guide that is assessable to both experts and management. It also
provides a practical framework that allows insurers to assess risks, visual-
ise areas of concern and record the effectiveness of implementing con-
trol barriers.
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Rapid digitisation is radically transforming the way business is conducted worldwide. Along with
increased productivity and opportunity comes emerging technological dangers such as cyber-
attacks. Conventional assessment frameworks rate risk based on historical frequency and severity
of losses incurred, this method is effective for known risks but, due to the absence of historical
data, prove ineffective for assessing cyber risk. Cyber risk requires innovative assessment meth-
ods to provide more accurate management tools and risk transfer pricing. In this paper, we pro-
pose a cyber risk classification framework using a combination of a bow-tie and risk matrix
approaches and call it QBowtie. We detail the framework and then apply it to a target institution.
The resultant analysis allows insurers to easily visualise, classify and quantify the cyber risk of
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companies and will help guide the creation of insurance products and underwriting decisions.
Likewise, it can be used by companies to prioritise risk mitigation strategies and to help promote
investment in more secure IT infrastructures and controls within their organisations.
Cyber risk can be defined as the financial loss or reputational damage resulting from a failure
in an organisation’s IT systems (The Institute of Cyber Risk Management 2014). Cyber-crime has
cost the global economy around $600 billion in 2017 (McAfee 2018). A data breach costs a com-
pany on average $3.92MM per breach, according to IBM security report in 2020 (Ponemon
Institute 2020). Cyber risks are dynamic due to continuous digital innovations, the increased use
of internet-enabled devices and the ongoing sophistication of hackers. Business-interruption
costs and the reputational damage following an attack can be detrimental to a company’s busi-
ness. Financial services companies are particularly vulnerable and are key targets for cybercrimi-
nals. Vulnerability to cyber-attacks increases exponentially as companies become more reliant on
electronic data, the use of cloud computing, social media, mobile devices, third-party software
and outsourcing. The fast pace of technological developments, the potential for correlated risk
exposures and the lack of historical claims data makes it difficult for insurers to quantify future
losses (Bahşi, Franke, and Friberg 2019).
Published empirical data on cyber risk is limited; however, an annual report by Ponemon
gives a well-documented account of data breaches (Ponemon Institute 2020). The report (ibid)
says most expensive data breaches occurred in United States with average total cost of a data
breach for $8.19MM and the most expensive industry was healthcare with $6.45MM per breach.
Average size of a data breach is 25,575 records.Greisiger’s results, which focus on claims pay-
ments, are lower than those of the Ponemon report, which reported on expenses incurred.
According to a governmental report, more than half of UK businesses have not identified their
cybersecurity breaches (Sharf 2016).
Cyber insurance protects against financial losses associated with the IT network and system
failures. Currently, market penetration is relatively low; only one third of US business have some
kind of cyber insurance (Romanosky et al. 2017). New legislation relating to cybersecurity is com-
ing into effect in many jurisdictions. These regulatory initiatives are trying to have a positive
impact on the uptake of cyber insurance. For instance, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), which came into effect on 24th May 2018, replaced the EU Data Protection Directive 95/
45/EC. This changed European data protection laws significantly and applied to all companies
storing or processing the personal data of EU citizens. Penalties for non-compliance are severe
(Rubinstein and Petkova 2018). It is anticipated that the cyber insurance market will grow signifi-
cantly due to the introduction of these regulations Augustinos et al. (2016). It is anticipated that
the cyber insurance market will grow significantly due to the introduction of these regulations
(Augustinos et al. 2016). The total global premiums are around $2 billion and are estimated to
reach $20 billion within a decade (Dobie and Collins 2015).
In recent years, there has been an increase in academic literature published in the technology
sphere relating to cyber-defence (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013), cyber risk control systems
(Byres and Lowe 2004), cyber technology evaluation (Bajcsy et al. 2004), and cyber-threat detec-
tion techniques (Kaur and Singh 2014). In contrast, despite the growing relevance of cyber risk
for businesses, there has been a limited academic investigation into the topic from a business,
economic and insurance perspective. The main academic articles on cyber risk and insurance
highlight the challenges relating to the modelling, quantification and lack of historical data
(Biener, Eling, and Wirfs 2015; Maillart and Sornette 2010), cyber risk correlations and complexity
(Hofmann and Ramaj 2011; €Og€ut, Raghunathan, and Menon 2011), and the problem of informa-
tion asymmetry (Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail 2003). According to Toregas and Zahn (2014), the
main barriers to the market development are a dearth of standards and difficulties with quantify-
ing risk for insurance purposes. Biener, Eling, and Wirfs (2015) consider information asymmetry
to be the most significant hurdle to the expansion of cyber insurance. An obvious obstacle to
the development is the lack of claims data because of the early reluctance of companies to
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admit cyber breaches. California was the first U.S state to bring in mandatory reporting with 90%
of the US states following suit. For this reason, more breaches have been documented in the U.S
than in Europe. Current cyber insurance has evolved into a product that minimises the cost of a
cyber-attack through supportive services. For example, some policies include access to an inci-
dent response service, forensic services, and PR and breach coaching.
Another major hindrance for cyber insurers is the difficulty in accurately categorising security
breach incidents (Gai et al. Elnagdy, Qiu, and Gai 2016a,b). Elnagdy, Qiu, and Gai (2016) develop
a cyber-classification model to represent the correlation of cyber-incidences and map cyber-inci-
dences to insurance products in one information system. Insurance policy premiums are predom-
inately based on weighted parameters relating to costs and risks posed (Ma et al. 2016). The
complexity and potential interconnection of cyber-incidences make it challenging to map the
correct risk classification. Elnagdy, Qiu, and Gai (2016) find that an ontology-based approach is a
practical solution to connect insurance cover and cyber risks. Cyber insurance differs from other
more traditional lines of business such as car insurance because of the difficulty in assigning a
value to the digital information. Ruan (2017) endeavours to address this by introducing cyber
risk measurement units, using a novel multidisciplinary approach,” Cybernomic”. Cybernomics
combines economics and cyber risk management to analyse the requirements of a data bank,
which enhances risk analytics, enabling the valuation and assessment of the exposure of digital
assets, while improving the management of residual risk.
Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail (2003) specify a framework to utilise insurance as a mechanism for
cyber risk management concerning data security, which concerns the entire risk management
process, including a comprehensive strategy for making insurance decisions. Gai et al. Elnagdy,
Qiu, and Gai (2016a) propose a framework, which combines multiple techniques, both technical
and business to assess cyber-security incidences for financial firms to improve decision-making
and help to lower the cost of cyber insurance.” Monte Carlo simulation” is used in incident iden-
tification to model the correlation between cyber-incidents, with the cyber-incidents hierarchy
established through determining the associated relationships (ibid). Others (B€ohme and Kataria
2006) classify correlated cyber risks properties into internal (within a company) and external
(across independent companies). Correlation of cyber risk is an indicator of potential further
cyber breaches. Using a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) model, Mukhopadhyay et al. (2013) pro-
pose a cyber vulnerability assessment based on Copula-aided Bayesian Belief Network (CBBN).
This model also computes expected loss and can be used by companies to understand their vul-
nerabilities and therefore, the usefulness of cyber insurance.
This paper covers a gap in the academic literature by proposing a cyber risk classification and
quantification framework for insurance companies. It is designed to demonstrate the significance
of proactive and reactive barriers in reducing companies’ exposure to cyber risk, enabling the
implementation of informed cyber risk management plans and assess the risk regarding different
risk factors captured by bow tie analysis. With more data, the framework can be developed into
a fully quantitative method to assess cyber risk, enabling a more accurate and comprehensive
assessment of the risk by insurers. The framework can also be used as an effective visual mech-
anism to communicate advice to insurers’ current customer base and potential future customers
on how to maintain and/or improve their cyber risk rating. The framework presents a methodo-
logical approach to rank organisations based on their cyber-security posture. Cyber-security pos-
ture refers to the company’s cyber-security strength, and its vulnerability to cyber-threats,
considering the likelihood and potential consequences of cyber-incidents.
In order for a cyber risk classification framework to be effective, it needs to be one that can
adapt to the dynamic nature of the risk and evolve when data becomes available as the risk
emerges. The proposed method involves combining a bow-tie model with a risk matrix to pro-
duce a rating based on the likelihood of a cyber-threat occurring and the potential severity of
the resulting consequences. A bow-tie model on its own is limited as it does not produce quanti-
tative conclusions when assessing risk (Lu et al. 2015). To overcome this, the framework
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combines a bow-tie model with a risk matrix. The risk matrix introduces ranking criteria for likeli-
hood and severity/impact, to quantify the overall cyber risk and give a cyber risk rating. The
advantage of this methodology is that it allows the use of expert opinion, appended with quan-
titative and qualitative information, to produce a risk matrix. Presently, quantitative data on eco-
nomic loss is slowly forthcoming, but its usefulness is limited by the lack of a priori data on
cyber-incidences (Re 2017). The proposed framework fills the gap by creating an intermediate
semi-quantitative method that measures cyber risk from an insurance perspective until there is
sufficient data available, which will allow insurers to create a more comprehensive, fully quantita-
tive cyber risk rating framework.
Up to now, there have been many academic and industry endeavours to fulfil the gaps of
data and risk management cases shortcoming in cyber risk studies. Many successful models and
methods have been creating to deal with different problems regarding these gaps from different
perspectives. Our proposed model, QBowtie, builds upon the limitations of these models through
building the bow-tie model for risk analysis. Table 1 summarises significant models, standards,
and frameworks used in cyber risk management. These are briefly introduced, critiqued in terms
of cyber risk analysis, finally compared to QBowtie.
A significant cyber threat assessment methodology is CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring
System), where a score is given to a cyber vulnerability according to its characteristics (Sheehan
et al. 2019). The characteristics used for calculation of the score include the impact of the attack
(ibid). CVSS can be used by experts to find threats/vulnerabilities and score them in our model.
FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk) is another methodology in cyber risk factor assessment
that uses risk factors taxonomy to calculate their likelihood and magnitude (Wangen,
Hallstensen, and Snekkenes 2018). Anything that can impact threats and consequences regarding
the risk is a risk factor. NIST SP800 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special
Edition) is a method to barriers for cyber-threats. This method can be used to find different bar-
riers regarding different threats (Nurliyani 2019). OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and
Vulnerability Evaluation) is a framework for identifying assets in risk, the threats, and vulnerabil-
ities that can make these threats happen (Alberts et al. 1999). OCTAVE-S is also used for medium
and small businesses. This method has three phases of progressive workshops. Organisational
and technological view of risk are reviewed in phases one and two of OCTAVE. Strategies and
mitigation plans are developed in the final phase. Another risk assessment and mitigation frame-
work called TARA (Threat Agent Risk Assessment), which is designed in Intel Co. scores cyber
threats and chooses the most important ones for mitigation (Rossebo et al. 2016). This model is
beneficial for experts using QBowtie when they are scoring the threats from 1 to 5. CORAS is
another security risk analysis method which tries to find threats and vulnerabilities with a model-
based approach ((Lund, Solhaug, and Stølen 2010). This approach benefits from a language and
UML-based modelling tool. QBowtie can help CORAS in the process of finding threats and vul-
nerabilities related to a case with bow-tie analysis.
QBowtie can have two different relations with cyber risk analysis models. In some cases, it
can fill a gap in a model. In other cases, that model helps QBowtie in one of its phase from iden-
tifying to scoring threats. For example, QBowtie can use OWASP (Open Web Application Security
Project) to identify security threats and vulnerability in web applications and portals. OWASP pro-
duces standards and security checklists and procedures for web-based systems (Kellezi,
Boegelund, and Meng 2019).
Maturity models have been developed to assess the ability and effectiveness of systems in dif-
ferent situations. The higher the level of maturity of the system, the greater its ability to deal
with different situations, including potential and actual risks (Paulk 2002). The output of the
QBowtie model can be used to examine cyber risks in particular levels of different maturity mod-
els. Two famous maturity models can benefit from our risk classification framework, CMMI
(Capability Maturity Model Integration) and IoTMM (Internet of Things Maturity Model). A well-
known model of maturity used in information technology systems, especially in the software
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Table 1. Brief description of IT-based risk/threat/maturity models, their advantage and disadvantages, and their relation to
our proposed QBowtie model.
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industry, is the CMMI model. CMMI is a requirement in many US governmental contracts. It
defines five different maturity steps, where one of the points raised in the third level is the cyber
risk dimension (Chaudhary and Chopra 2017). In IoT-based systems, there is another maturity
model called IoTMM. This model seeks to help developers of IoT systems understand what level
of maturity they are at and what they need to achieve the desired level (Almajali et al. 2019).
Experts can find related cyber threats and vulnerabilities for organisations that use
IoT technology.
2. Methodology
The bow tie method is a risk evaluation method used to analyse and demonstrate causal rela-
tionships in risky scenarios. It was developed by the Shell Group under the name of HEMP
(Hazard, Effect and Management Process), but known internally as the “bow-tie diagram”
(Zuijderduijn 2000). The approach offers an overview of different risk scenarios under analysis
with the causes and consequences of an incident depicted in the diagram. A bow-tie was con-
structed following steps as described by Mulcahy et al. (2017) and Lu et al. (2015). In brief, this
involves identifying the Hazard (e.g. Data Storage) and Top Event (e.g. Cyber Attack/Data
Breach). On one side of the bow-tie are Threats, Proactive Barriers and Threat Escalators. On the
other side are Consequences, Mitigation or Reactive Barriers and Severity Escalators. The termin-
ology associated with the bow-tie framework varies in different researches. For the sake of clar-
ity, we must note that threats are the same as causes in other bow-tie researches. Reactive
barrier escalators can be considered as the potential failure of the safety barriers, and proactive
barrier escalators, potential failure of mitigation plans and tools. Finally, consequences are the
same as impacts in some other bow-tie research literature.
The bow-tie model construction was based on published data relating to cyber breaches/
cyber-attacks (McAfee 2014; Ponemon Institute 2020), published data sets (Klahr 2017) and pub-
lished claims data (Tungatt 2017; Colvin and Dougherty 2017). The results recorded from the
data sources were ameliorated by IT security experts’ opinions, allowing the fault tree to be
grounded on the frequency of occurring risks/threats and the event tree consequences/severity,
based on published claims data and cyber breach notification disclosure data. The IT security
experts invited to take part in interviews to elicit the most relevant barriers and escalators for
inclusion in the bow-tie analysis. Once the framework was constructed, follow-up semi-structured
interviews were conducted, and the experts scored the barriers and escalators. Semi-structured
interviews give the flexibility to follow different lines of inquiry, once in conversation, rather than
being fixed to a set agenda, which gives stronger interview results (Jenner et al. 2004; Rabionet
2011; Whiting 2008). The results were tabulated and entered into the bow-tie model. To be clas-
sified as an IT security expert, the candidate has to meet the minimum requirements of
Table 1. Continued.
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possessing a third level qualification and greater than ten years of experience in the subject mat-
ter area. For this concept implementation, three experts were chosen as a representation of the
IT security expert population.
In our QBowtie methodology, we benefit from bow-tie analysis in identifying all risk factors.
We use different risk analysis methods and maturity models as tools for experts in the identifica-
tion process. In Figure 1, different phases of the QBowtie risk classification methods are pre-
sented as a graphical abstract. As the first and second phases of identifying risk factors (threats,
impacts, barriers, and escalators) finish, the quantification and classification phases start. In the
third phase, we will score the risk factors, and the last phase of QBowtie classifies the cyber risk.
In the following, all of these phases are described in detail.
We assign variables to the barrier and escalator variables from cyber risk insurance proposal
forms. Besides, IT security experts assisted in the process of identifying the components variables
to include in the bow-tie. If the consensus was unanimous, then the variable was included. The
experts then scored the Barriers and Escalators a value between 1 and 5 and assigned an appro-
priate weighting based on the rank of the particular threat path. As this score was based on the
expert’s opinion, a uni-polar construct was used with a five-point scale, as this is found to be the
most reliable for scoring judgement Krosnick and Fabrigar (1997); McKelvie (1978). The five
points were labelled as follows: 1 Not at all effective, 2 Slightly effective, 3 Moderately effective,
4 Very effective, 5 Extremely effective.
Today, risk matrices are the most frequently used mechanism to present risk in the workplace
(Collier et al. 2006) due to their ease of use and suitability for the assessment and ranking of a
diverse spectrum of risks. The literature on the employment of risk matrices, in general, comes
from the enterprise risk management, safety engineering, strategic and project management
fields. A risk matrix is a semi-quantitative method used in risk assessment and is constructed
based on the event likelihood and severity. The results of the fault tree provides the likelihood
value and the event tree the value for severity. Additional industry loadings were applied to the
variables ranks likelihood on five levels: very unlikely, unlikely, possible, likely and very likely, and
severity based on low, moderate, critical, severe and catastrophic. Mulcahy et al. (2017) suggest
Figure 1. Outline of QBowtie method for risk classification.
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that bow-ties can give a false sense of security through the identification and implementation of
barriers. To combat this, an advisory aspect has been incorporated into the framework, which
gives prudent advice and information to current/potential customers based on where the com-
pany lands on the risk matrix.
Rating scales are the most commonly used measure for qualitative data, such as expert opin-
ion which can be classified as ordinal data as it does not have any numeric value attached to it
(Hand 1996). Therefore, it is not appropriate to use the mean and standard deviation to interpret
the results of the experts’ scores used within the proposed framework, such descriptive measures
can only be used when the data is quantitative (Svensson 2001). For this study the most suitable
measures are the median and, as it is a small sample size, the minimum and maximums scores
as appropriate (Svensson 2001). Risk is calculated by multiplying likelihood and consequence. As
shown in equation 1, Bi, j is the weighted barrier scores for the i
th threat and jth category.
Bi, j ¼ BSMi, jPn
j¼1BSMi, j
(1)
Where BSMi, j is the expert barrier score median for the i
th threat category and the jth barrier.
Similarly, Ei, z can be calculated as the weighted escalator score for the i
th threat and
zth escalator.
In examining the sources of uncertainty when converting qualitative expert opinion to quanti-
tative score, the following should be considered: (1) lack of domain knowledge which is because
of the nature of cyber risks and (2) inevitable expert bias. To reduce these destructive effects
when gathering score samples, more knowledgeable and experienced experts should be consid-
ered. The number of experts referred to in the study should also be as large as possible.
It is unreasonable to assume that all cyber risks can be identified; therefore, to account for
this uncertainty, the framework assumes a residual risk of 20%. We also assume that Barriers are
3 times as effective as Escalators giving a Total Barrier effectiveness to Total Escalator effective-
ness ratio of 3:1. The number of Barriers/Escalators can vary depending on the Threat category.
The assumption of having 20% residual risk and 3:1 Barrier/Escalator effectiveness ratio comes
from consensus out of two different methods: Cyber risk experts brainstorming and interviews,
and out-of-sample validation set concept in parameter estimation. A part of identified risks from
the case study were put in a validation set and were tested with different values extracted from
interviews and brainstorming sessions for residual risk and Barrier/Escalator effectiveness ratio.
The best values with justifiable results under brainstorm method were chosen as the framework
parameters. These parameters are shown as gauges in the Figure 1 to emphasis on the frame-
work users’ ability to set them to any other value that suits different risk domains and applica-
tions. As more relevant data becomes available, QBowtie framework may also be adapted to
incorporate more robust parameter uncertainty and residual estimation methods such as
(Bignozzi and Tsanakas 2016).
If Ti is the i
th threat allowing for residual risk, then the reduction in the threat likelihood is









Ti  Ei, z
 !.
3 (2)





Ti  LRið Þ (3)
An additional industry loading is applied to the results of the fault tree analysis depending on
the industry sector of the company being assessed, see Table 2.
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For the Consequence/Event Tree Calculation, we again assume that residual risk is 20%, and
the ratio of Total Barrier effectiveness to Total Escalator effectiveness is 3:1. Using similar nota-
tion, we state that the reduction in the consequence severity, SRi is given by equation 4 where j




Ei, zÞ=3 is the applied escalator weight. This gives the Sum of the Individual Consequence















Ci  SRið Þ (5)
An additional severity loading is applied to the results of the event tree analysis, depending
on the industry sector of the company being assessed, see Table 3.
The values for the Likelihood Rating (L) and the Severity Rating (S) are applied to the risk
matrix to calculate the Cyber Risk Rating (CRR).
3. Results
3.1. Expert rating scores
The distribution of the results of the experts’ rating scores for the barriers/escalators used in the
bow-tie analysis is presented in the following bar charts. The barriers in Figure 2 below are div-
ided into the five threat categories: Hacker (T1), Anti-Virus (T2), Insider –“Human Error/Malicious”
(T3),”Lost/Stolen Device” (T4) and “Other Vulnerabilities” (T5). The threat barriers “Back-up” (T2)
and “Restricted Access” (T3) received the highest median scores for level of effectiveness as a
control/barrier for their threat category, with “Training” (T1), “Honeypot” (T1), and “Employee
Vetting” scoring the lowest median scores 2.
The threat escalators in Figure 3 below are divided into the five threat categories. The threat
escalators “No Patch Management” (T2), “Windows XP as Operating System” (T2), both received
high median scores in relation to their effectiveness to increase the likelihood of a threat occur-
ring. “Cloud migration” (T1) had the lowest median score.
The consequence barriers in Figure 4 are divided into the four consequence categories:
Business Interruption (C1), Financial Loss (Incl. Reinstatement of Data costs) (C2), Reputational
Damage (Incl. Loss of Clients, Exposure of Sensitive Data) (C3), 3rd Party Claims and Regulatory
Table 3. Additional Severity Loading by Sector. Data Source: (Ponemon Institute 2020).
Industry Rank Sector Ind. Cost per Capita Severity Rating (S)
1 Healthcare Financial Services 25% (SIS þ 25%)
2 Financial Services 20% (SIS þ 20%)
3 Business Services 15% (SIS þ 15%)
4 Education & Life Sciences 10% (SIS þ10%)
5 Retail/Communications/ Technology /Manufacturing/Other 5% (SIS þ 5%)
Table 2. Additional Industry Loadings. (AIG and Claims Intelligence Series 2016).
Industry Rank Sector % of Claims Likelihood Rating (L)
1 Financial Services 23% (STL þ 23%)
2 Communications & Technology 18% (STL þ 18%)
3 Retail 17% (STL þ 17%)
4 Business Services 9% (STL þ 9%)
5 Manufacturing/Healthcare/Other 8% (STL þ 8%)
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Fines (C4). The consequence barriers “Business Continuity Plan” (BCP) (C1), “Recovery Procedure”
(C1), “Auditing System” (C1), “Offsite Back-up” (C1), “Disaster Recover” (C2), “Incident Response
Plan” (C3), “Sandboxing” (C3), “GDPR Compliance” (C4), “Standards Compliance” (C4), “Legal
Team” (C4), and” Limited Liability Contract” (C4) all score high median.
The consequence escalators in Figure 5 are divided into the four consequence categories, as
before, for the consequence barriers. “Compliance Failure” (C4), “Contractual Obligation” (C4),
and “Processing of Sensitive Data” (C4) all receive high median scores with “Outsourcing” (C2)
receiving the lowest median score.
Figure 2. Experts median scores for threat barriers.
Figure 3. Experts median scores for threat escalators.
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3.2. Threat analysis results
The results of the construction of the fault tree are presented in Figure 6. The threat categories
are listed on the left-hand side of the diagram, in rectangular shapes. The percentage figures on
top of each threat category represent the frequency of claims attributed to each threat category,
based on data from AIG and Claims Intelligence Series (2016) and Netdiligence (2019). For
example, in the first threat category “Hacker” this figure is 27%. The figure underneath each
threat category is the percentage frequency of claims less 20% (residual risk). The threat barriers
(proactive) are listed running left to right in the ovals. For example, the first threat category is
“Hacker”; the first barrier is “Firewall” and the last is “Intrusion Detection and Prevention System”
(IDPS). The figure on top of each barrier represents the median score for that barrier divided by
the total of the median barrier scores for that category. For the “Firewall” barrier, this figure is
Figure 4. Experts median scores for consequence barriers.
Figure 5. Experts median scores for consequence escalators.
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0.20. The total of the weight of each barrier within each threat category equals the threat cat-
egory frequency less residual risk.
The threat escalators are listed running left to right, represented by hexagon shapes. In the first
threat category “Hacker”, the escalators are “Storage, process, transmit sensitive data”, “Extensive
cloud migration”, and “Outsource any part of Network, Data centre, etc.”. The figure on top of each
escalator represents the median score for that escalator divided by the total of the median escalator
scores for that category. The total of the weight of each escalator within each threat category equals
the threat category frequency less residual risk. In the framework, barriers are three times as effective
as escalators. Therefore, the sum of the escalators for each threat category is divided by three and
subtracted from the sum of the barriers. The result is subtracted from the frequency of the threat
category. The blue diamond shape on the lower right-hand side of the diagram displays the overall
likelihood result, which will be between 0.2 and 1.0 for the threat analysis.
3.3. Consequence analysis results
The results of the construction of the event tree are presented in Figure 7. The consequence cat-
egories are listed on the right-hand side of the diagram, in rectangular shapes. The percentage
figures on top of each consequence category represent the percentage of resultant insurance
claims, following a cyber-attack, which can be attributed to each consequence category, based
on data from Corporate, Allianz Global and Corporate, et al. (2017). For example, in the first con-
sequence category Business Interruption, this figure is 33%. The figure underneath each conse-
quence category is the percentage claims” consequences following a cyber-attack less 20%
(residual risk). The consequence barriers (reactive) are listed running left to the right in oval
Figure 6. Left hand side of bow-tie diagram for top event Data Breach illustrating threats (rectangles), barriers (ovals) and
escalators (hexagons).
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shapes for each consequence category, for example, in the first consequence category, the bar-
riers are; “Business Continuity Plan”, “Recovery Procedure Plan in Place”, “Auditing Redundant
System” and “Data Backed-up Off-Site”. The Consequence escalators are listed running left to
right, represented by shapes, for each consequence category. The same procedure for calculation
of the barriers and escalators used in the fault-tree apply to the barriers and escalators in the
event tree below. The grey diamond shape on the central right-hand side of the diagram dis-
plays the overall severity result, which ranges between 0.2 1.0 for the consequence analysis.
3.4. Industry loadings and risk matrix
A 5 5 risk matrix is used to rank and present the overall score of the analyses, including the add-
itional industrial loadings applied, see Figure 8. The diamond shapes represent the results of the fault
tree and event tree analyses. The industry loadings are applied to the analysis scores. The loadings
applied for likelihood and severity depends on the industry ranking applied. The top-ranked industry
to suffer a cyber-attack is financial services, and the industry with the highest severity ranking follow-
ing a cyber-attack is healthcare. The risk matrix (below) is divided into 5 rating bands.
3.5. Case study application of the conceptual framework
The framework was tested on a city hospital in Europe. One of the IT security experts who par-
ticipated in the scoring of the bow-tie variables (barriers and escalators) works as an IT manager
at the hospital. The details of the particular barriers and escalators employed at the hospital
were confirmed. The answers were tabulated and applied to the framework. The hospital (system
of hospitals and healthcare facilities) is one of the largest in Europe, with more than 15,000
employees. All employees have access to the computer system. The hospital is divided into five
complexes, with sites varying in size. In addition, it includes a large number of smaller healthcare
Figure 7. Right hand side of Bowtie diagram for top event Data Breach illustrating consequences (rectangles), barriers (ovals)
and escalators (hexagons).
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units/centres for out-patient care across the city. The hospital’s central IT organisation shares the
operation, administration, management and maintenance of all IT, including the overall policies
and risk management plans for all healthcare units that are part of the hospital system. Some of
the IT systems are managed at the individual sites. The hospital has its own Chief Information
Officer (CIO) and Information Services (IS)/IT division with full responsibility for information secur-
ity. Each IT manager, on divisional and branch level, is responsible for the education and training
of their employees. All IT aspects are conducted in-house.
The results quickly show that there is no staff awareness training for the hacker category and staff
process sensitive data. Employees are not vetted, employees can work from home and remotely,
and their activities are not monitored. The IT team are conducting a cloud migration. The likelihood
score from the threat analysis is 0.42, and the additional likelihood loading for healthcare is 0.034
giving an overall likelihood score of 0.45. From the event tree analysis, it is clear that IT connectivity
is critical to the business. The business is heavily reliant on IT services, but there is no effective risk
control process in place. There is no capability to wipe data remotely, and there is no customer noti-
fication procedure in place despite the storage of sensitive data. No compliance audits are con-
ducted, and finally, they do not conduct staff training for third party claims and regulatory fines. The
severity score from the consequence analysis is 0.40; the additional severity loading for healthcare is
0.108. The overall severity score is 0.50. This puts the hospital’s cyber risk rating at 9 in the orange
band. This case study demonstrates that the framework can not only offer a risk score (threat and
consequence), but it can pinpoint steps that can/should be taken to improve the security measures.
Likewise, it affords an insurance company a robust quantitative and qualitative assessment approach.
4. Discussion
4.1. Cyber insurance market
Emerging risks, such as cyber risk, are predicted to be the main growth drivers for the insurance
industry (Marotta et al. 2017). This expansion is even more challenging without historical claims
Figure 8. Cyber risk Matrix. The Threat is on the vertical axis, while the severity is on the horizontal. The combined score is
mapped to a quadrant, and the top right represents the riskiest company, while the bottom left represents the least
risky company.
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data to quantify cyber risk plus the ever-changing risk landscape. As the cyber insurance market
develops, insurers will require tools to offer competitive premia without exposure to excessive
risks. To achieve this, many insurers are looking beyond their traditional alliances, developing
new partnerships with IT security vendors who can offer IT security expertise and provide sup-
portive services as part of a cyber insurance product.
The results of our framework show that the threat category “Hacker” is the most likely cause
of a cyber-attack/breach. For this category, the experts scored Encryption and Intrusion
Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) as the most effective barriers of prevention, with fire-
walls next. Barrier mechanisms such as firewalls, encryption and IDPS have numerous types; for
example, a firewall can be a hardware appliance, software on a PC or a router (Oppenheimer
2011). Their effectiveness is dependent on the type, for instance, data encryption or network
encryption, quality and the deployment technique used. IDPS detection, for example, uses tech-
niques such a “signature-base” or “statistical anomaly” methods to identify malicious traffic
(Oppenheimer 2011). Therefore, the efficacy of the mechanism/system will vary subject to
deployment techniques used by the vendors and where they are implemented within the organ-
isation. Consequently, when evaluating cyber risk, insurers should rate the quality and ensure
that best practices and procedures are followed.
Another significant factor when assessing a company’s vulnerability to the Hacker category
threat is whether they use outsourcing. Our experts scored Outsourcing high as a potential escal-
ator for this threat category. Hackers are becoming increasingly skilled at using third party com-
panies as channels of attack, extending companies’ cyber vulnerabilities to those of their
partners. An example of this is the Petya ransomware attack which originated in Ukraine and
spread across the globe, largely through outsourcing partners or subsidiaries (Aidan, Verma, and
Awasthi 2017). This demonstrates how poor partner cyber-security reduces the effectiveness of a
company’s own security investments. One escalation factor barrier would be to require all part-
ners to adhere to certain information security standards, such as the ISO/IEC 27011:2013
Schweizerische (2013).
Staff Awareness Training scored higher than Anti-Virus Software and Web Filtering for the
threat category Malware, Virus, and Ransomware. This is most likely due to the fact that human
error poses a significant cyber risk, yet trained staff can also be valuable defensive barriers. As an
illustration, untrained staff may not be able to identify a phishing e-mail, while a trained staff
member can understand preventive procedures and act as an enabler for existing IT security bar-
riers (Augustinos et al. 2016). Certification is one method of demonstrating a company’s level of
staff awareness training. In 2014 in the UK, the government launched the “Cyber Essentials
Scheme” in a bid to improve the level of cyber-security of SMEs (Cyber Essentials 2015).
Following that, cyber insurers such as AIG and Swiss Re have adopted this as an assurance cer-
tificate of UK SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) cyber-security.
The results of the framework show that the consequence category Business Interruption is the
most likely outcome following a cyber-attack/breach. Connectivity critical to the Business and
Business Heavily Reliant on IT Services were scored as the most significant severity escalators for
Business Interruption. The experts scored the preparedness barriers, Business Continuity Plan and
Disaster Recovery Plan, high as reactive barriers in the event of a cyber-attack/breach. The high
score for such barriers is consistent with the results of a study by (Ponemon Institute 2020),
which found that incidence response barriers are an effective means of containing and reducing
the cost of a cyber-attack/breach.
The experts scored Storage and Processing of Sensitive Data high as an escalator for increas-
ing the severity of the consequence categories Reputational Damage and Third Party Claims and
Regulatory Fines. Data breach costs for heavily regulated industries such as healthcare, education
and financial services are significantly higher than for other less regulated industries, like trans-
port and media (Ponemon Institute 2020). It follows that higher accountability increases the
severity of consequences following a cyber breach. It is important for companies handling
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sensitive information to identify their level of sensitivity and criticality, and to categorise it for
each stakeholder (Customer, Corporate, Third Party, and Employee), in the data life cycle accord-
ingly. Such an approach would facilitate companies to establish a cyber risk management strat-
egy, which could subsequently be used to guide meaningful cyber protection and mitigation
investments. With the introduction of the GDPR in 2018, fines may negatively impact the reputa-
tion and revenue of companies falling victim to cyber-attacks/breaches. Perhaps, in anticipation
of the implementation of the new regulations, the experts scored Compliance with GDPR and
Compliance with Standards as the most important barriers for consequence category Third Party
Claims and Regulatory Fines. Along with increasing the demand for cyber insurance, the intro-
duction of the GDPR is likely to increase EU companies’ investment in security protection meas-
ures. This may improve the risk posed to EU insurers.
4.2. Results of the case study
From an insurer’s perspective, the analysis of the hospital highlighted that there was no Staff
Awareness Training for the Hacker category, and the hospital does not Vet Prospective
Employees and Monitor Employee Activity. If these barriers were implemented, and the escalator
removed, the hospital’s risk likelihood score would be reduced from 0.45 to 0.39. The event tree
analysis shows that the hospital does not have a Risk Control Process in place, nor do they con-
duct Staff Awareness Training in relation to Third Party Claims and Regulatory Fines. Were this
rectified, then the hospital’s risk rating would be reduced from 0.50 to 0.42. In summation, if the
recommendations mentioned above were applied, the hospital’s cyber risk rating would be
reduced from 9 to 6 on the cyber risk rating matrix.
According to a survey conducted by the UK government (Klahr 2017), only 28 per cent of
FTSE 350 companies have invested in comprehensive cyber-attack training. The report also high-
lighted the increased severity of cyber breaches for different sectors, with the healthcare sector
ranked highest. In the case study, the hospital has a large number of employees with access to
the system, which increases human error vulnerability. Moreover, the hospital has a centralised
IT system in place; this increases the potential severity of attacks, as once one part of the system
is breached the whole system is potentially at risk. Human negligence can be reduced through
awareness training and monitoring of employees. This is something that the framework high-
lights as an area that needs to be addressed.
Finally, As Mulcahy et al. (2017) mention in their research, there must be a safety manage-
ment system that supports the bow-tie framework results. This management system must
include continuous training and maintenance subsystems. Without a continuous active manage-
ment process, the bow-tie risk assessment will be a piece of paper and holes in the barriers
makes the situation similar to failures that happen in Swiss Cheese model (Reason 2000) and the
model will lose its practical and advisory value.
5. Conclusion
The rapid digitisation of organisations, along with the widespread use of internet devices, has
resulted in the emergence of cyber risk. Most companies either do not fully understand the
potential severity or appreciate the extent of their cyber vulnerabilities. This has resulted in a
low market penetration of cyber insurance. However, with the increase in cyber-attacks/breaches
and the implementation of new data protection regulations in many insurance jurisdictions, the
cyber insurance market is predicted to grow rapidly over the coming ten years. The main aca-
demic articles on cyber risk and insurance highlight the challenges relating to modelling, quanti-
fication and the lack of historical claims data. With this in mind, this research paper presents a
methodological approach to rank organisations based on their cyber-security posture. The
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proposed method involves combining a bow-tie model with a risk matrix to produce a rating
based on the likelihood of a cyber-threat occurring and the potential severity of the resulting
consequences. The advantage of this methodology is that it allows the use of expert opinion,
appended with quantitative and qualitative information.
The application of the proposed cyber risk classification framework has demonstrated that it
would allow insurers to assess risks, visualise areas of concern and record the effectiveness of
implementing control barriers. This would enable them to give advice on how insureds can
improve their rating, thus reducing their insurance premiums. The framework could be reapplied,
before insurance renewals, to confirm insureds have maintained an acceptable level of cyber risk.
Furthermore, insurers could use the framework to understand the risk posed by individual
threats, consequences or risks to different industry sectors, to guide insurance product develop-
ment. This would facilitate insurers in the development of new standalone cyber insurance prod-
ucts or “add-on” to current cyber insurance policies. Thus enabling them to cater for specific
insurance needs and provide additional support services to reduce the likelihood of a cyber-
attack and help mitigate the consequences following an attack. From an insured’s perspective,
the framework could be used as a visualisation tool to guide their cyber risk management strat-
egies and prioritise their cyber-security investments.
We demonstrate the efficacy of the approach using a large European hospital as a case study.
The resultant analysis shows how quickly threats and consequences can be identified and how
ameliorating actions can reduce those threats. The quantitative score allows for a comparative
analysis. As more data becomes available through regulatory disclosure requirements, insurers
claims’ experience and data sharing, the framework can be developed into a fully quantitative
cyber risk classification method.
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